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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
official policy, position, or endorsement of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States 
Special Operations Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the 
Department of Defense, or the United States Government. 
The current Secretary of Defense strongly desires a transformation of the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  While Secretary Rumsfeld’s definition of transformation may be somewhat vague and 
possibly limited in scope, the questions before the court are not only whether the U.S. military 
will successfully transform itself, but should it want to do so?  When analyzing the current U.S. 
military environment, and comparing it to conditions where successful military transformations 
have occurred in the past, I would argue that although the U.S. military’s “informatizing” has the 
capacity to prompt transformation change (and a true revolution in military affairs (RMA)), it 
will not cross that threshold in the next 10-15 years, if at all.  Given the U.S.’s current dominance 
of the conventional battlespace, I would argue that the Department of Defense (DoD) should 
pursue incremental change, and not transformational, because the greater the gap in our 
military’s conventional superiority, the more incentive provided to military adversaries to 
employ truly asymmetric strategies against us.  The non-military adversaries we are encountering 
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), such as terrorists and insurgents, already have every 
incentive not to fight the U.S. on its own terms; it is our existing conventional superiority that 
has driven others to turn terrorism into a form of war, which in turn makes our existing military 
paradigm less applicable than ever.  Given that approximately 90% of DoD spending is allocated 
to systems that have little added value in fighting terror nets and guerrillas, the preponderance of 
any transformational changes would positively affect conventional forces more so than SOF—
which are arguably better suited to conduct operations outside of the conventional spectrum of 
conflict such as the counterproliferation (CP) of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and low-
intensity conflict (LIC) environments.  And, these are the operations most likely in the GWOT’s 
future. 
That being said, there are several pre-conditions necessary to successfully promote the 
transformational change of our military.  These conditions, taken in a historical context, seem to 
  
answer the question “why” or under what circumstances successful transformation has occurred 
in the past.  Looking at both internal and external factors of former successful transformations, I 
would argue that the U.S. military does not currently look like the militaries that made a 
transformational leap.  While several of the following conditions might currently apply to the 
U.S., I argue that these conditions are only slowly advancing the military towards the threshold 
that it must cross in order to achieve a transformation changes and full modernization, while 
several conditions not met will only make possible incremental changes and thin modernization 
of our military. 
The German military of the post-WWI era found themselves in the world of the “large 
and the few” trying to operate as the “small and the many.”  This mentality was the result of the 
first condition necessary for transformational change—an increase in the lethality and precision 
of firepower that had made the traditional battlefield uninhabitable.  Due to its almost total 
domination in the conventional arena, the U.S. military’s leadership views the current battlefield, 
as extremely hospitable.  While one could argue that guerrilla tactics are definitely taking their 
toll on morale and public will in the ongoing GWOT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
relatively small number of U.S. casualties has not resulted in a feeling that the U.S. has lost 
control and dominance of the battlefield.  More devastating tactics by terrorists, such as WMD 
attacks, would be necessary to convince senior military leaders that transformation might be 
necessary in order to minimize the U.S.’s vulnerability to such “new” threats, while also 
providing a more capable force to counter such threats in the future.  This misunderstanding of 
the true nature of the threat, inadvertently created by the U.S. through its conventional 
dominance, has not been realized (or accepted) to date.  Until such guerrillas or terrorists release 
the next level of devastation, the U.S. military will continue to believe that it has a monopoly on 
firepower, and to feel “at home” and comfortable on the battlefield where we dominate.   
  
Largely due to the U.S.’s failure to understand the true nature of the threat it will likely 
encounter in the future, the U.S. military is not ready for a change in its current warfighting 
paradigm.  This highlights the second condition necessary for transformational change—the 
military or political necessity for a transformation.  This lack of necessity may, in large part, be 
due to the fact that technology can often undermine imagination insofar as applications and uses 
of that new technology.  The German military of post-WWI fostered innovative ideas, especially 
from below.  The German military did not punish those who thought “outside of the box” and 
against status-quo activities, so the environment was ripe for such transformational leaps.  The 
necessity for such transformation opened the eyes of the senior leaders, who were looking for a 
new warfighting paradigm that would raise their country to the status they believe it deserved.   
In contrast, U.S. institutional leadership has a long track record of innate conservatism 
and maintaining the status quo.  Just as the entire DoD fought the creation of USSOCOM in 
1986, the “powers that be” continue to resist any changes to the status quo; consequently, there is 
little incentive to support such changes.  Even seventeen years after USSOCOM’s creation, there 
is still dissention among U.S. senior military leadership with regard to SOF.  This is best 
explained by the “institutionalist” view, which assumes that organizations are more concerned 
with the internal distribution of status and power than with organizational goals.  In this case, 
future relevance within the US military is determined by the preservation of current budgets, and 
the acquisition (expansion) of one’s budget at the expense of another’s.  Essentially, the reward 
structure of the U.S. military’s leadership is based on such competition, and will not change until 
made to do so from an outside (i.e. civilian) force. 
A philosophy of institutional leadership that fosters true decentralization and de-control is 
a third key condition needed for transformational change.  Understandably, given the “zero-
defect” mentality of conventional U.S. military leadership as a result of our military’s failures 
  
during Vietnam, putting one’s fate in a subordinate’s hands is a difficult leap of faith.  However, 
while our military leadership talks about decentralized execution, they don’t seem to 
comprehend that true combat power comes from “command and de-control” (i.e. network-based 
warfare).  The U.S. military only performs these “friction-free” operations out of necessity when 
no other options are available or feasible.  For example, in Afghanistan, SOF were allowed to 
employ their skills to remove the Taliban regime only until the point where conventional forces 
could take over operations, even though situations more suited for SOF or clearly requiring 
unconventional forces remained. 
Unfortunately, technology advances have resulted in more centralization than 
decentralization; now, the lower echelons must “feed the machine” information needed for 
decisions that could better be made at lower echelons.  This increased centralization supports the 
notions that change does not necessarily result in innovation, and that reliance on technology can 
definitely undermine imagination and foresight into technology’s true implications and 
capabilities to make warfighting more efficient.  The Germans, if no one else, realized this when 
they invested in the human capital of their military’s officers to best facilitate decentralization as 
an organizational and doctrinal change to support their warfighting transformation.  Ironically, 
the U.S. continues to miss the boat in regards to the application of information dominance to 
empower smaller units to operate in a distributed manner. 
Arguably the most important condition necessary for the Germans’ post-WWI 
transformation was their WWI defeat/humbling that opened their eyes to the possibility of 
transformation.  As the fourth condition, recognizing failure is essential to taking the next step, 
and I would argue that a failure in either Iraq or Afghanistan (as this generation’s Vietnam) 
might be necessary before the military will realize the possible transformation staring it in the 
face.  This compliments the fifth condition necessary for transformation—the failure of the 
  
current paradigm of warfare.  The Germans experienced both of these conditions during WWI 
that enabled them to recognize where they went “wrong” and to transform themselves into 
something that supported their new paradigm of combined-arms warfare.  It could be argued 
then, that the DoD has only recently realized a “failure” of their current paradigm by 
acknowledging that they are engaged in a counterinsurgency (COIN) or guerrilla warfare 
campaign in Iraq.  When taken in context of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, what 
other evidence will be required to provide proof of the new kind of warfare being waged by our 
GWOT adversaries?  But, there have been no doctrinal or organizational changes made to date to 
address a new strategy to defeat such a threat.  I believe our military views this anomaly as an 
“exception to the rule,” suggesting that the old paradigm is still correct, but that there are just 
“special circumstances” in Iraq.  This is merely another method of defending or “saving” the old 
paradigm of warfare, even in the face of evidence that would seem to refute its validity.  Thus, 
the concept of the “paradigm as a hindrance to understanding” is currently preventing critical 
thinking about the unconventional or militarily irregular problem at hand in Iraq. 
A final condition necessary for transformational change is a full understanding of new 
technology and its capabilities.  As often has been the case throughout history, technology 
designed for a specific purpose has often not been used to its maximum, optimal, or full potential 
as it could have more holistically affected warfighting.  The Germans dealt with this problem 
through use of a “central acquisition organization” that integrated technology across the services.  
It effectively shared the ideas/innovations of technology uses so that there was more than one 
brain implementing technology unilaterally.  By comparison, the U.S. military does acquisition 
in a “service vacuum” which greatly limits the advances and potential gains in technology from 
one service to another within the DoD.  Better cross-pollination of technological uses, concepts, 
and ideas might allow for a broader analysis of the capabilities of any given technology acquired 
  
within the DoD.  It could be argued that the U.S. military’s Joint Staff attempts to do this very 
thing by validating requirements, but tactical considerations are often overlooked due to a lack of 
subject-matter expertise and vision.  Once again, service parochialism is its own worst enemy, a 
hindrance to transformation, and will result in a full modernization of the military much later 
than possible—and given the poor conditions under which transformation must be pursued, the 
RMA, as originally defined by Michael Roberts, is not a reasonable expectation in the near 
future. 
Technology is the crux the potential transformational change, or “informatization” RMA.  
While it is certain that technology advances in the late 20th century have changed society, insofar 
as ease of communications, global inter-connectivity, and the relative speed at which information 
dissemination and distribution occurs, I would argue that these advances have not fundamentally 
changed society to any significant degree (Roberts’ first criteria of a RMA).  While there are 
those that would argue that society was forced to change because technology now touches 
virtually everything Americans do, the fact remains that if it all went away tomorrow, life as it 
currently exists would only be less convenient, responsive, and immediately gratifying.   
Second, as a RMA usually involves, or is spurred by, a significant technology change, 
networked organizations merely contribute to efficiency and allow the U.S. to remain one step 
ahead of its competitors.  U.S. information superiority allows the decision cycle to be a little 
faster than its adversaries, but I do not believe that a marginal increase in speed or efficiency 
constitutes a revolution; an evolution would seem to be more accurately descriptive.  Only when  
the military can effectively gain a virtual information monopoly (where we know everything, and 
we have the ability to keep an adversary from knowing anything other than what we allow him to 
know) will the concept be truly revolutionary.  
  
Third, a RMA results in a change in the size of military forces on the battlefield.  While 
many of the current systems arguably give the U.S. the capability to operate as smaller, more 
distributed forces in a decentralized and de-controlled manner, U.S. doctrine and organization 
has not changed in any significant fashion in order to capitalize on this capability.  This 
notwithstanding, the transformational changes envisioned for the DoD are merely designed to 
make the U.S. military lighter and more flexible, but only with an emphasis on the conventional 
forces.  There is more of an emphasis on less weight than of size of forces on the battlefield.  In 
Iraq, for example, the decentralization and de-control of Brigade/Task Force-sized elements is 
more of an operational necessity driven by the confining and restrictive nature of the urban 
battlefield, than by a desire to operate in a more distributed or networked manner.  There will be 
those that will contend that the U.S. military was able to conduct Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 
with significantly less forces than Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, but this 
“test drive” of Secretary Rumsfeld’s new warfighting concept proved little given the quality of 
the enemy engaged.  While the Iraqis may have been the world’s third largest military force, 
there is something to be said for quality over quantity.  The relative ease as which U.S. forces 
achieved initial victory over Iraqi military units during the most recent campaign must be 
tempered by the fact that the U.S. wasn’t really challenged enough to emphatically prove 
anything. 
Lastly, true RMAs result in a change in doctrine and strategy.  To date, there have been 
few, if any, changes in U.S. doctrine or strategy based on information-based technologies—we 
just do the same things we’ve always done, just slightly faster.  Some would possibly contend 
that the U.S.’s edge in information systems has allowed our military to support the national 
policies of preemptive strikes and preventative wars.  Once again, I would caution against such 
conclusions, because those policy decisions are based more on nonproliferation/CP goals than 
  
any goal to exploit the advantages and potential capabilities of U.S. information and technology-
based systems.  It is out of pure necessity (possibly desperation) that the U.S. has implemented 
such national policies; they are attempts to protect national interests from potential users of 
WMD—not a pursuit of a RMA. 
It would be an easy case to argue that there have been dire unintended consequences born 
from the U.S.’s conventional military superiority.  As such, there are very few potential 
adversaries that would ever consider challenging the U.S. military on the conventional 
battlefield.  As the guerrillas in Iraq have obviously observed and are currently exploiting (as did 
the NVA in Vietnam, the clan warlords in Somalia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda 
worldwide), the U.S. military is ill-prepared to deal with threats on either side of the 
conventional band of the spectrum of conflict (WMD and LIC).  Adversaries of the U.S. realize 
that they must attack their enemy where he is weakest, and the U.S. is most vulnerable to the 
employment of WMD and in the application of guerrilla tactics during LIC.  I would argue that 
the DoD should not want to transform itself in any other way other than by thinly modernizing or 
incrementally transforming, because to do otherwise would only further encourage its 
conventional adversaries to pursue methods of engaging the U.S. in ways that our military is ill-
prepared to counter—truly asymmetric warfare.  GWOT targets already know they have to fight 
us asymmetrically, yet DoD is still not sufficiently investing in systems essential to fighting 
terror nets and guerrillas.  This argument relies heavily on my hypothesis that if the military were 
to fully modernize or execute a transformational change, the institutional conviction in the 
current warfighting paradigm would result in only marginally increased capabilities, and would 
have a limited effect outside of the conventional spectrum of conflict.  Any benefit gained 
outside of the conventional warfighting arena would be a “fringe benefit” or unintended 
  
consequence, as opposed to the goal or focus of a paradigm shift; and not what SOF needs to 
effectively fight the GWOT in the future. 
A wise professor once told me, “There is danger in reckless change, and reckless danger 
in blind conservatism.”  Unfortunately, I believe this conservatism and its associated preferences 
results in the U.S. military’s norm of innovative and transformational failure.  Not withstanding 
the institutional biases towards “making it work” with what they have, “product champions,” 
overwhelming civilian intervention, and innovative-friendly career paths would all be required to 
literally force the DoD to pursue anything other than incremental transformation.  While there 
are those who would contend that Secretary Rumsfeld can “force-feed” transformational change, 
I would argue that although an extremely powerful and influential individual, he does not have 
adequate political backing, or a sufficiently comprehensive and integrated vision to see his ideas 
through to fruition—the stars are no longer aligned (assuming that he might have been able to do 
something of this magnitude immediately after the attacks of 9/11).  In this case, I do not think 
the military’s conservatism is necessarily a bad thing, as it necessarily protects our national 
security by changing itself only when warranted, as opposed to executing whimsical changes 
based on fads or deficient doctrine based on selective historical interpretation.  Transformational 
change at this point would be much too technology-centric, and based on results against, at best,  
mediocre adversaries. 
While it is believed that a significant technological change often paves the way for true 
RMA, the information systems technology that would lead to the military’s potential RMA has 
too many critical vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses that would further push its adversaries 
towards asymmetric warfare.  If a relatively inexpensive nuclear device (or similar device with 
EMP effects) could totally disable all of the information-based systems that the total 
transformation of the U.S. military would logically be based upon, path dependent and single-
  
point-of-failure systems could be easily compromised and exploited by an imaginative, 
resourceful, dedicated, and financially-constrained enemy.  In my opinion, U.S. military 
leadership thinks that the single-point-of-failure, information-centric, and technology-based 
warfighting paradigm is too risky a proposition on which to base the nation’s defense.  As was 
proven in Somalia in 1993, high-technology solutions will not always be successful over enemies 
using low-technology strategies.  Similarly, nineteen terrorists using low-technology weapons, 
transportation, and information systems were able to do more than $1.7 trillion in damage to the 
U.S. economy with minimal resources.   
Maybe what is needed for the U.S. at this juncture, is a strategy similar to that of the 
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 1948-1982.  They were less innovative in the area of warfighting 
concepts, but, compared to their adversaries, much more so in their ability to adopt and 
effectively integrate existing concepts to counter the threat they faced in the Middle East.  Their 
use of a more selective acquisition strategy to match technology and tactics might be more 
feasible for application within the DoD.  This would seem more reasonable given where our 
military currently stands with regards to a true RMA. 
While my observations and analysis can be considered as less than overly optimistic, I 
believe they are realistic interpretations of the current state of affairs with the DoD.  When 
compared to post-WWI Germany, the U.S. does not currently find itself under the same 
favorable conditions that would spur a transformational change in the military.  There are simply 
too many significant conditions unsatisfied to permit such a leap at this time, or at any time in 
the foreseeable future.  In my opinion, the U.S. will continue to reinforce success by incremental 
changes in the conventional arena—at the expense of the other things that it does not do as well.  
I also conclude that the U.S. military should not want to radically transform itself given the 
“new” threats it is facing in the post-Cold War era.  Asymmetric warfare is the U.S.’s most 
  
challenging venue, and the less the U.S. forces its potential adversaries down that road, the more 
secure its national defense will be in the near-run.  The U.S. will get more “bang for its buck” by 
pursuing innovative ways to use the technologies it already possess to mitigate risks it has 
already accepted in the extreme (WMD and LIC) sectors of the spectrum of conflict.  Full 
utilization of the capabilities the U.S. military already possesses, but is not optimally employing, 
could arguably contribute significantly to minimizing risks it currently encounters in its defense 
posture.  Unfortunately, you can’t have your cake and eat it too, so the U.S. military should 
better cultivate innovative thinkers (read human capital investment), who are afforded the 
latitude to fully exploit the U.S.’s capabilities-based force structure to cover more area along the 
spectrum of conflict.  In short, the U.S. military should develop a more holistic approach to 
warfighting in order to better defend against threats outside of the conventional arena, by thinly 
modernizing under the umbrella of incremental transformation. 
  
